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Blockchain Technologies and
Remittances: From Financial
Inclusion to Correspondent Banking
Ludovico Rella*
Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
Since their emergence, blockchain technologies have shown potential for financial
inclusion and the formalization of remittances. Recently, regulators and practitioners
have studied the capabilities of blockchain technologies to streamline and, potentially,
replace the infrastructure underpinning cross-border payments and remittances,
i.e., correspondent banking. Correspondent Banking Relationships, also called
“Nostro-Vostro accounts,” are continuous bilateral arrangements that enable banks to
provide services in countries where they do not directly operate. After the Global Financial
Crisis, this infrastructure has undergone “de-risking,” i.e., a reduction of correspondent
accounts and their concentration in fewer financial institutions, with especially detrimental
effects on costs and speed of retail cross-border remittances. The existing literature has
mostly focused on the point of sale of remittances, often overlooking correspondent
banking. This paper, in contrast, connects remittances, blockchain technologies, and
correspondent banking with the growing interest of critical social science in the
significance of payment infrastructures for the constitution and configuration of money,
finance, and markets. By unpacking the critical case of Ripple, this paper shows that
blockchain applications to remittances focus on profits, risks, costs, interoperability,
“trapped liquidity,” and “idle capital” in correspondent banking accounts, rather than
on financial inclusion per se. In so doing, this paper contributes to critical social
studies literature on the formalization of remittances, understood as the transformation
of remittances into a market frontier. Blockchain applications are shown to foster,
rather than resist, remittances formalization, and they are presently being incorporated
into existing infrastructures, business models, and regulatory structures. Rather than
representing radically alternative monetary systems, blockchain technologies are the
latest iteration of technologies heralding frictionless capitalism. Lastly, this paper shows
the tensions and ambiguities inherent to interoperability and formalization. Blockchain
technologies are dynamic in a way that problematizes dichotomies such formal-informal
and mainstream-alternative. Hence, rather than providing a quantitative assessment
of the impact of blockchain technologies, this paper investigates the ambiguities and
tensions in the political economy and imaginaries inscribed in the materiality and design
of blockchain-enabled payment systems.
Keywords: remittances, formalization, correspondent banking, de-risking, blockchain technologies, cross-border
payments, infrastructures, inclusion
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INTRODUCTION
Cross-border payments have been one of the earliest and
most promising applications of blockchain technologies (Mills
et al., 2016). This is hardly surprising since blockchain
technologies emerged to manage monetary transactions in
Bitcoin’s distributed network (Nakamoto et al., 2019). Blockchain
and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) promise instant
clearing and settlement, and immutable and transparent
recording of transactions (Ali et al., 2014; Mori, 2016; Godfrey-
Welch et al., 2018). Emerging at the fringe of formal finance,
and often in opposition to it, blockchain technologies are
presently caught in a dynamic of “co-opetition” (Leal, 2014), i.e.,
of de-politicization of their design, and increased competition
between business implementations. Corporate co-optation of
blockchain technologies leads to ambiguous dynamics in the
payment space, caught in between interoperability and enclosure,
disintermediation and re-intermediation, disruption, and rent
extraction (O’Dwyer, 2012, 2015).
Regulators, established financial institutions, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are turning toward
blockchain technologies as promising tools for financial
inclusion of the “unbanked” and “underserved,” and for the
“formalization” (Mitchell, 2007) of hitherto informal value
transfers, such as remittances (Silverberg et al., 2015; IMF, 2017;
World Bank, 2017). Several start-ups and established firms
are pursuing a similar agenda for more inclusive cross-border
payments and remittance transfers. Four firms are frequently
mentioned: BitPesa, Abra, Stellar, and Ripple. This study focuses
on Ripple, a start-up that promises to use blockchain technologies
and interoperability protocols to streamline the underpinning
infrastructure of remittances, that is, correspondent banking.
Remittances have long been part of a “financial inclusion
assemblage” (Schwittay, 2011) that comprises public agencies,
NGOs, IGOs, private actors, and consortia, striving toward
inclusion, and, more recently, digitization. At the same time, the
“migration-development nexus” discourse frames remittances
as an untapped market of informal value transfer (Durand
et al., 1996; Bailey, 2005; Davies, 2007; Faist, 2008) that could
explode in magnitude if more people had access to formalized
financial services and mobile and digital technologies (cf.
Kleine and Unwin, 2009; Roy, 2010; Mader, 2018). An impetus
toward formalization drives both inclusion and digitization
(Mader, 2016; Datta, 2017). Formalization stands for the effort
toward making visible informal assets and internalizing them
into market dynamics (Mitchell, 2007). Formalization turns
remittances into assets that can be capitalized upon by extracting
transaction fees, monetizing users’ data, and leveraging these
payment streams into more sophisticated financial products
(Hudson, 2008; Gabor and Brooks, 2017).
The existing critical, inter-disciplinary social scientific
literature in which this paper is situated tends to focus on the
point of sale and the everyday experiences and subjectivities
of remittance payers and payees, and thereby leaves payment
infrastructures under-researched. This paper, in contrast,
will make a distinctive contribution by connecting the study
of remittances with the growing interest of critical social
science in the significance of payment infrastructures for the
constitution and configuration of money, finance, and markets.
In this literature, payment infrastructures are understood to
be political-economic technologies that produce and shape
spatialities of inclusion, exclusion, and monetary circulation
(see Jeffs, 2008; Desan, 2014; Roy and Crane, 2015). This paper
does therefore not provide an economic analysis of the impact,
success, or failure of applications of blockchain technologies in
remittances, nor does it measure and assess the efficiencies they
generate in the payment industry more broadly.
Instead, this paper investigates the political economy
inscribed in the materiality and design of applications of
blockchain and DLTs in remittances and cross-border payments
(see Bátiz-Lazo et al., 2014; Nelms et al., 2018; Swartz, 2018).
Specifically, we will focus on how blockchain technologies
formalize remittances by streamlining their underpinning
clearing and settlement infrastructure, i.e., correspondent
banking. Correspondent banking is “the provision of banking
services by one bank (the “correspondent bank”) to another
bank (the “respondent bank”)” (FATF, 2016, p.7). These
Correspondent Banking Relationships (CBRs), organized in
“Nostro and Vostro” accounts, are the infrastructural backbone
of most cross-border payments, including remittances (CPMI,
2014). Despite its importance, however, correspondent banking
barely figures at all in the literature on cross-border payments
and remittances (CPMI, 2016a).
As a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis, CBRs
are presently undergoing “de-risking,” i.e., a reduction in the
number of active bilateral arrangements (“corridors”) between
currency areas, and a concentration in the number of banks
managing correspondent relationships (World Bank, 2015a, p.1).
De-risking is particularly detrimental for remittances, in that it
disproportionately affects Money Transfer Operators (MTOs),
NGOs, and local banks (FATF, 2016; Eckert et al., 2017).
Furthermore, for many financial institutions, correspondent
banking accounts are increasingly understood to represent costly
and inefficient “idle capital.” The result of de-risking is that some
banks and even entire countries might be completely cut off
from transnational remittance corridors. Hence, customers may
find themselves incapable of sending and receiving remittance
payments, or they might incur in dramatically higher fees (World
Bank, 2015b, p. 31).
The core argument of this paper is that concerns about
risks and efficiencies presently animating correspondent banking
arrangements—rather than financial inclusion agendas per
se—are driving the application of blockchain and DLTs in
remittances. Previous critical social scientific research argues
that digital technologies for financial inclusion are actually
motivated by the monetization of users’ data (Maurer, 2015a).
This paper argues that the application of DLTs within existing
correspondent banking arrangements aims to reduce costs and
fees, and to mobilize the idle liquidity “locked up” in Nostro
and Vostro accounts (Maurer, 2016). This is achieved through
interoperability, understood as the visibility and synchronization
of payment systems to and with each other. Interoperability, in
turn, enables real-time clearing and settlement of transactions.
Ripple is almost the only case where blockchain, correspondent
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banking, and remittances overlap. Hence, a study of this
company is timely and relevant to apprehend the tensions
and opportunities inherent to the application of blockchain
technologies to cross-border payments.
This article comprises four parts. Section Materials and
Methods will outline the methodology followed for this study.
Section The Remittance industry from the Point of Sale to
Cross-Border Payment Infrastructures will provide an overview
of the literature on remittances and its relative neglect of
payment infrastructures. Combining Results and Discussion
section will unpack correspondent banking and its present
transformation. Moreover, it will illustrate the application of
blockchain technologies for payments and remittances through
the case study of Ripple. Section Results and Discussion will
also conclude by illustrating the limitations and ambiguities
inherent to the promises that blockchain technologies purport.
Section Conclusions concludes by elaborating further on the
contribution of this paper to critical social literature on money,
finance, and blockchain technologies.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This paper draws on 18-month fieldwork constituted of
participant observation of industry meetings, conferences and
trade fairs (Høyer Leivestad and Nyqvist, 2017), online
ethnography in online forums and group skype calls (Hjorth
et al., 2017), 15 in-depth interviews, and analysis of regulation,
policy papers, and other online multimedia material. This
research project has received ethical approval and clearance by
the Departmental Research Ethics Geography Sub-Committee of
the Department of Geography at Durham University, UK, on
the 31st May 2017. All subjects gave written informed consent
following the Declaration of Helsinki.
This paper follows a case study research design that lies
between and takes insight from both gaps and holes (GAH),
and social construction of reality (SCR) research designs as
recently defined by Treiblmaier (2019) in this journal. First,
following the GAH research design, correspondent banking
and payment infrastructures were identified as the paramount
gap in the existing literature on remittances. Hence, potential
case studies were selected among companies that operated
at the infrastructural level, rather than at the point of
sale of remittances. Subsequently, theory-building followed an
SCR design derived from the critical social science literature
on money, finance, and markets, especially drawing on
poststructuralism and Science and Technology Studies (STS).
Rather than using case studies to test or disprove new and
existing theories, Ripple here represents a critical case, one that
achieves “the greatest possible amount of information on a
given problem or phenomenon” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 77). Hence,
this study does not provide generalizability through replication.
Instead, it “builds theory from the rich descriptions gained
during the analysis process” (Treiblmaier, 2019, p. 7). Rather than
assessing success and failure in deploying a specific technology,
the research design of this study follows a radically interpretivist
epistemology (Cavaye, 1996). This paper unpacks the politics
of design of a particular technology together with the cultures,
imaginaries, and political economies associated with its use. In
this context, the very criteria of assessment of success and failure
form part and parcel of the technology itself: the case “assumes
the sociality of knowledge, the circulation of discourse as its
condition” (Berlant, 2007, p. 668). In so doing, one has to be
aware that “one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with
data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (Yin, 2003,
p. 18; cf. Leszczynski, 2018).
This paper focused on blockchain applications to interbank
payment infrastructures, rather than user-centered retail
remittances because this emerged as the central gap in the
existing literature. A survey of the current literature evidenced
BitPesa, Abra, Ripple, and Stellar as the most cited use cases of
blockchain technologies for remittances and payments (Vigna
and Casey, 2015; Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016; World Bank,
2017, 2018; Burniske and Tatar, 2018; DuPont, 2019). As it will
be expanded upon in section The Application of Blockchain
Technologies to Correspondent Banking, only Ripple and
Stellar provide applications of DLTs to correspondent banking
infrastructures. Stellar solutions for cross-border correspondent
banking are still in their infancy, while Ripple has a well-
documented record of partnerships with banks and MTOs. The
difference in empirical material also made it hard to justify a
comparative research design between Stellar and Ripple. Hence,
Ripple was chosen as the critical case of this research.
THE REMITTANCE INDUSTRY FROM THE
POINT OF SALE TO CROSS-BORDER
PAYMENT INFRASTRUCTURES
Remittances are “household income from foreign economies
arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement
of people to those economies” (IMF (ed), 2009), p. 272).
These transfers happen through a variety of formal or
informal channels. Informal arrangements comprise physical
transportation of cash and hawala, i.e., informal credit
networks of intermediaries called hawaladars (Thompson, 2008;
Martin, 2009; Rusten Wang, 2011). At the formal end of
the spectrum, meanwhile, Remittance Service Providers (RSPs)
include banks, post offices, and credit unions and non-bank
financial intermediaries (NBFIs) of which Money Transfer
Organizations (MTOs) are the most important (Orozco, 2004;
UPU, 2013; Deloitte, 2017). Remittances grew from US$2 billion
in 1970 to US$31.2 billion in 1990, to more than US$400 billion
in 2016 (Datta, 2017, p. 539). In this period, remittances overtook
overseas development assistance (ODA), coming second to
foreign direct investment (FDI) in many developing countries
(Ratha, 2003; IDB, 2006; Wills et al., 2010; Hudson, 2015). This
impressive growth caused remittances to attract attention from
researchers and practitioners.
Development economics frames remittances as “aid that
reaches its destination” (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2010, p. 218),
and assesses their economic impact in terms of net gains and
losses, efficiencies, and market failures (Heilmann, 2006; Yang,
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2011). This literature focused on measuring the “migration-
development nexus,” whereby remittances ostensibly transfer
resources in a way that is beneficial for both the global South
and North (Datta, 2012, p. 141). Remittances are also praised as
counter-cyclical, informal welfare systems that to lift families out
of poverty, and that benefit the originating countries’ balance of
payments (Barham and Boucher, 1998; De Haas, 2005; Brown,
2006; Hudson, 2008; Mazzucato, 2009).
However, critical scholarship has questioned the
emancipatory and transformative potential of remittances
by highlighting its distributive asymmetries and hierarchies,
illuminating how inclusion entails a dynamic of “adverse
incorporation” (Aitken, 2010). Remittances are traversed by a
“mission drift from poverty alleviation to profit maximization”
(Roy, 2010, p. 386). The constellation of actors that push for the
formalization of remittances is critically understood as “poverty
capital” (Roy, 2010), or the “financial inclusion assemblage”
(Schwittay, 2011). According to the “migration-development
nexus,” remittance formalization fosters development through
financial inclusion, freeing the untapped markets and idle
assets that compose the “fortune at the bottom of the pyramid”
(Prahalad, 2005; Collins et al., 2009). But, understood more
critically, the poor constitute a frontiers market (Mitchell, 2007;
Aitken, 2015): they are the “missing billions to be discovered,
accounted for, channeled and harnessed for development”
(Kunz, 2011, p. 49). In short, poor people “do not only possess
assets but are assets” (Roy, 2010, p. 64).
Within the poverty capital business, the expansion of retail
payment technologies has fostered the emergence of “poverty
payment,” i.e., “the idea that the design of digital platforms
for the transfer of value, agnostic as to what value is being
transited or what it is being used for, has positive spillover
effects that ultimately benefit poor people” (Maurer, 2015a, p.
128). This proliferation of mobile technologies and the political
and industry-led effort toward cashless transactions lead to the
emergence of a “fintech-philanthropy-development complex”
(Donovan, 2012; Omwansa and Sullivan, 2012; Ojong, 2016).
While payments are usually capitalized upon via transaction
fees (Cirasino and Ratha, 2009; Cross, 2015), poverty payment
is inscribed in a tendency across the payment industry away
from fees and toward leveraging behavioral and transaction data
(Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Maurer, 2012a, 2016).
As Datta (2017) has it, we can understand this move toward
inclusion and digitization as an effort toward the formalization
and mainstreaming of alternative and informal remittance flows.
Mitchell (2007, p. 248) argues that markets have boundaries
and limits, and there is a frontier region that lies between
“market” and “nonmarket” relations. This frontier separates
the formal economy, where assets’ ownership is recorded and
fixed, and where everything can be traded for a price, from
informal economic relations, where ownership regimes and
freedom of exchange are more flexible. Development economics
helps to extend the rules of markets into informal economies
by “technologies of representation” such as “property records,
prices, or other systems of reference.” These technologies allow
the mobilization, pricing, and trading, in short, the capitalization
on “dead capital” and idle assets (Soederberg, 2013, 2014;
Schwittay, 2014; Mader, 2018). Blockchain technologies are a
particular form of technologies of representation that allow
interoperability and seamlessness of transactions between the
members of the network.
In sum, the existing literature on remittances has productively
unpacked the “point of sale” of remittances (Maurer et al.,
2013), their affective economies (Hudson, 2015, p. 246), their
cultural content (Carling, 2014; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou,
2017), and the motives of senders and of recipients (Levitt,
1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Lacroix et al., 2016; Vari-
Lavoisier, 2016). More broadly, it has also pointed toward the
place of remittances and digital payments in the business of
poverty capital, or what Maurer (2015a) aptly terms “poverty
payment.” However, comparatively less attention has been given
to payment infrastructures, i.e., the technologies, devices, social
and institutional arrangements, and accounting practices, that
allow and measure the value transfer from payer to payee
(Lindley, 2009; Siegel and Fransen, 2013; Pollard et al., 2016;
Rea et al., 2017). Payment systems and their design have to be
appreciated in their profound distributional and, indeed, political
implications (Desan, 2014; Maurer, 2015b). This is the focus of
the next section.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Correspondent Banking and Remittances
While banks themselves tend to take a back-seat position
when it comes to providing direct remittance services, formal
remittance services often rely indirectly on a network of cross-
border Correspondent Banking Relationships (CBRs) (Erbenová
et al., 2016, p. 17). Correspondent Banking is a continuous
arrangement between financial institutions that enable banks to
provide services in countries where they do not directly operate.
It covers cash management, international wire transfers, check
clearing, payable-through accounts, and foreign exchange (FX)
services (The Wolfsberg Group, 2014). Correspondent Banking
Relationships (CBRs) encompass so-called “Nostro and Vostro”
accounts. Nostro is the account of the respondent bank held by
the correspondent bank. Vostro is the account on the books of
the correspondent bank, conducted on behalf of the respondent
bank (World Bank, 2015b, p. 13). Correspondent banking can
be either limited to one respondent-correspondent relation,
or “nested” or “downstream,” when one correspondent bank
serves several respondent financial institutions simultaneously
(BCBS, 2017, p. 24).
Correspondent banking is a distinctive feature of cross-
border payments, due to the lack of a worldwide infrastructure
of clearing and settlement. Clearing entails the exchange of
relevant payment information between the payer’s and payee’s
accounts, and the calculation of claims to settle. Settlement is
the final discharge of a valid claim by moving funds from the
payer’s account to the payee’s account (Rambure and Nacamuli,
2008). In domestic payments, messaging, clearing, and settlement
frequently happen in parallel to each other through Automated
Clearing Houses (ACH), and central bank Deferred Net
Settlement (DNS) retail payment systems (BIS, 2013). In cross-
border payments, however, no such worldwide clearinghouse
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exists, and transactions must pass through CBRs. Partial
exceptions are card payments, which are cleared by the card
provider, e.g., Visa or MasterCard, and some large transnational
MTOs like Western Union, which might manage independent
end-to-end payment services depending on jurisdiction-specific
conditions (CPSS, 2003; CPMI, 2014).
While flows of funds happen in the books of respondent
and correspondent banks, interbank messaging flows mainly
through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) (Scott and Zachariadis, 2013).
SWIFT is a member-owned, cooperative society comprising
more than 11,000 financial institutions across more than 200
countries and territories (SWIFT, 2019). SWIFT, however,
does not provide clearing and settlement, but only transaction
messages. Once received, correspondent banks process these
messages to calculate the amounts to clear. Settlement, finally,
happens through Foreign Exchange (FX) markets. Due to this
high number of intermediaries, clearing and settlement are
typically slower and more expensive in cross-border payments
than in domestic payments. Partial fixes to these risks and costs
are the introduction of the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS)
bank in 2002 (CLS Group, 2019), and some voluntary schemes
in place in specific corridors, such as the one between US and
Mexico (Orozco, 2004, p. 24).
In the past 10 years, the number of CBRs has decreased, and
it was concentrated in the hands of fewer financial institutions.
First, CBR reduction and concentration is a consequence of
de-risking, i.e., risk and cost reduction strategies, based on
regulatory compliance costs—e.g., Know-Your-Customer (KYC)
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating of the Financing
of Terrorism (CFT)—and real or perceived risk profiles of
partnering financial institutions (FSB, 2015). Second, revenues
typically associated with cross-border payments have been
shrinking, such as transaction fees, FX margins, interest on
Nostro-Vostro accounts, and float. Float is money “in flight”
between sender and receiver of a payment, and it is hence briefly
counted on both accounting books (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 2007). In 2015, cross-border payments accounted for 20%
of the volume, but 40% of the revenues associated with payments,
for a total of US$ 300 billion, and remittances accounted for
US$ 25 billion (McKinsey, 2016, p. 14). The growth in revenues
from cross border payments decreased from 4% in 2011 to 2% in
2015, and revenue margins declined 2% on average between 2011
and 2015 (Ibid). Furthermore, the drop in interest rates made
the liquidity stored in Nostro and Vostro account less profitable
(Bansal et al., 2016).
In 2015, the World Bank (2015a) found that 80% of
responding financial institutions reported CBR reduction and
consolidation, and 55% of local and regional banks reported spill-
over effects onto remittance-related companies. The Association
of Supervisors of Banks in the Americas (ASBA) confirmed
that, in 60% of responses, remittances were affected by CBR
reduction (Erbenová et al., 2016, p. 12). While this reduction
does not seem to impact on the volume and value of remittances,
it shows to have a severe impact on their costs (IMF, 2017, p.
19). The number of active correspondent accounts worldwide
fell from more than 520.000 to 480.000 (CPMI, 2016a, p. 15).
Another study by the World Bank (2015b) found that half of
the respondents directly experienced a decline in correspondent
banking relationships. Most of the large banks declared that
they actively reduced the number of their correspondent banking
relations in the 2012–15 period. The Financial Stability Board
estimated that, between 2011 and 2016, the number of active
corridors decreased by 6.3% (from 13,072 to 12,242), and the
number of active correspondents decreased by 6%. For the
corridors to and from the Dollar and the Euro, that jointly
represent more than 80% of the value of SWIFT payment
messages, the decrease was by 15% (FSB, 2017, p. 1).
These trends are uneven geographically, bearing
disproportionately on the Global South. While Europe and
South and Central Asia have seen a somewhat consistent
reduction in transaction costs between 2011, East Asia, Pacific,
Middle East, and both North and Sub-Saharan Africa have seen
an increase in transaction fees after 2014 (IMF, 2017, p. 20). In
the Middle East and North Africa, 40% of banks reported higher
costs related to compliance and fees associated with remittances.
Palestinian banks are under increased pressure and fears of CBR
terminations that would impact on a financial system already in
dire straits due to the relevance of the shekel in the Palestinian
economy (IMF, 2017, p. 17). In Sub-Saharian Africa, Liberia saw
the termination of almost 50% of its CBRs (36 out of 75) between
2013 and 2016 (Erbenová et al., 2016, p. 15).
Sub-Saharian Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific are
especially affected geographies. Angola has been highlighted as
particularly severely hit by Correspondent Banking reduction
and concentration. Just one correspondent bank was serving
six Angolan banks for foreign exchange services, and it was
providing US Dollar notes to 10 financial institutions in total.
In 2015, all those relations ceased. Hence Angolan banks had
to resort to downstream and nested correspondent banking
relationships with subsidiaries of Angolan banks in EU, Africa,
and Asia (World Bank, 2018, p. 15). The case of Angola is
emblematic of some commonalities across Africa, such as the
heavy reliance on correspondent banking and foreign currency
(mainly US dollar) to fund international trade, such as the Sino-
Africa trade (Sy and Wang, 2016; IMF, 2017, p. 18). In the
Caribbean, the Bahamas-Haiti corridor is another critical case:
75% of remittances are same-day settlement payments, which
means that de-risking could have close-to-immediate effects on
Haitian economy through remittance reduction (CPMI, 2015,
p. 10). The Pacific is considered problematic geography for the
relationship between correspondent banking and remittances:
the decrease of CBRs and the closure of remittance providers
brought to a halt. In the case of Samoa, furthermore, remittances
compose 18% of the GDP, with 80% flowing through Money
Transfer Operators that rely on the correspondent banking
infrastructure (IMF, 2017, p. 17).
These trends also affect MTOs and charities
disproportionately, due to their real or perceived higher
risk profile and lower profitability as clients of correspondent
banks. Between 2010 the number of MTOs that had at least one
bank account closed, resulting in an impediment to conduct
cross-border business grew from 26 to 54%, while the amount of
MTOs that did not have any account closed each year decreased
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from 67 to 42% (World Bank, 2015a, p. 7). As the World Bank
(2018, p. 13) has it, “remittances are a volume business, and
for small states, in particular, volumes are by definition small.”
Hence, a price increase and a reduction of channels through
which to send payments affect smaller countries more than
bigger ones, local banks more than transnational ones, and
Money Transfer Operators more than banks.
De-risking is particularly detrimental for remittances, because
it affects the Global South andMTOsmore acutely. Furthermore,
CBR reduction and concentration could push back a sizeable
amount of remittance forms back into informality (IFC, 2017,
p. 49) potentially also making AML and CFT screenings
less effective (cf. de Goede, 2003; Vlcek, 2010). To offset
these consequences, the IMF and the World Bank investigated
blockchain technologies as potential alternatives to Nostro
and Vostro accounts. Blockchain technologies promise to
introduce shared ledgers without the need to establish centralized
clearinghouses, making Nostro and Vostro accounts redundant
(IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2018). The next section, hence, will
focus on the relationship between Correspondent Banking,
blockchain technologies, and formalization.
The Application of Blockchain
Technologies to Correspondent Banking
The application of blockchain technologies in correspondent
banking centers on interoperability, i.e., with the mutual visibility
of ledgers, standards, payment infrastructures, and of individual
customers and transactions for spotting illicit behavior. As the
CPMI has it:
“Interoperable payment systems enable the seamless interaction
of two or more proprietary acceptance and processing platforms,
and possibly even of different payment products, thereby
promoting competition, reducing fixed costs, enabling economies
of scale that help in ensuring the financial viability of the
service, and at the same time enhancing convenience for users of
payment services. The consequences of low interoperability are
overlapping or limited coverage, sunken investment costs, and
inefficiency” (CPMI, 2016b, p. 34).
Blockchain technologies promise interoperability through shared
ledgers held by all banks operating cross-border remittances.
In 2017, the IMF outlined some of the potential use cases of
blockchain technologies in correspondent banking, focusing on
risk management, cost reduction, and real-time settlement (IMF,
2017, p. 35–36). TheWorld Bank further summarized distributed
ledgers’ potential as that of “creating a distributed network for
cross-currency funds settlement that replaces the correspondent
banking network [. . . ] lowering settlement costs and increasing
efficiency [. . . ]. DLT can also allow for new approaches to
correspondent banking, which can potentially be part of a
solution for addressing de-risking” (World Bank, 2017, p. 23).
Blockchain technologies emerged at the fringe of formalized
capitalism, and often in opposition to it. However, blockchain
technologies are undergoing co-optation by market actors, de-
politicization of their design, and increased competition between
business implementation, a dynamic labeled as “co-opetition”
(Leal, 2014). Corporate co-optation of blockchain technologies
leads to ambiguous dynamics in the payment space, caught in
between interoperability and enclosure, disintermediation and
re-intermediation, disruption, and rent extraction (O’Dwyer,
2012, 2015). Some examples are the UBS-led Utility Settlement
Coin (Kaminska, 2017), R3 Corda (2018), the experiments
by SWIFT (2018), and CLS (Allison, 2018) for distributed
messaging, clearing, and settlement, and the newly launched coin
by Morgan (2019). Furthermore, cryptocurrencies are striving
to achieve the status of a new asset class (Burniske and Tatar,
2018) to enable different ways of capitalizing on payments, in
addition to transaction fees and data monetization. In June 2019,
Facebook, together with a consortium of partners, announced its
cryptocurrency Libra, to be launched in 2020, which focuses on
financial inclusion and remittances (Libra, 2019).
Payments and remittances have been a crucial use case of
blockchain technologies since their inception. Bitcoin, the first-
ever blockchain promised to manage a distributed payment
network without a centralized institution for accounting,
clearing, and settlement institution (Nakamoto et al., 2019).
The first use case of blockchain technologies has been BitPesa.
Born in 2013, and inspired by the success of the Kenyan
payment system M-Pesa (Omwansa and Sullivan, 2012), BitPesa
manages payments between two fiat currencies by matching
them with payments from the originating currency to Bitcoin,
and from Bitcoin to the currency of the country of destination
(McKay, 2014; Scott, 2016). BitPesa has since expanded in
geographical reach by serving eight countries across Africa, and
it changed focus, from person-to-person (P2P) remittances to
business-to-business (B2B) operations, hence losing the original
emphasis on remittances per se (DuPont, 2019, p. 19). Hence,
BitPesa would not make a suitable case to study correspondent
banking, remittances and DLTs. The second example, Abra, was
mentioned by The World Bank as a system to manage “instant
peer-to-peer money transfers with no transaction fees [. . . ]
combining cryptocurrency with physical bank tellers” (World
Bank, 2018, p. 29). Currently, however, Abra seems to have
focused on providing cryptocurrency wallets, as well as investing
and trading services, rather than cross-border payments (cf.
Cotton, 2018, p. 116). Ripple, on the other side, remained
focused on cross-border payments, but it shifted focus from
P2P to interbank payments, with the specific aim of replacing
correspondent banking (Rosner and Kang, 2015). Stellar, which
was born by branching out from Ripple’s source code in 2015
(Mazières, 2016), is undergoing a similar path through the
implementation, with IBM, of World Wire, that aims to compete
with both Ripple and SWIFT (IBM, 2019a). The next section will
delve in more detail into the Ripple case.
Ripple: Formalization of Remittances and
Correspondent Banking
Older than Bitcoin itself, Ripple emerged in 2004 as a mutual
credit network like a hawala, a time bank, or a Local Exchange
Trading System (LETS). The primary use case for Ripple was
to provide an infrastructure for scaling up LETS and other
alternative currencies (Fugger, 2004). Between 2012 and 2013,
Ripple morphed into a distributed ledger technology—the XRP
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Ledger—that combines the mutual credit network with the
cryptoasset XRP and a distributed currency exchange (XRP
Ledger Project, 2019). Ripple is also the name of the company
that offers payment solutions built on top of the XRP Ledger, as
well as on other technologies.While Ripple still owns a significant
amount of the cryptoasset XRP, the XRP Ledger remains an
open distributed ledger, that is not under the direct control of
the company Ripple. Since 2015, the company Ripple focused
primarily on interbank payments, aiming to become a competitor
to SWIFT, and it currently counts 200 customers in 40 countries.
The XRP Ledger represents money in two ways: trust lines
and XRP. Trust lines are IOUs representing promises to pay
denominated in any unit of account they want. The system,
in fact, allows users to create entirely new currencies and to
program their behavior. If a direct trust line connects them,
people can pay each other by changing the balances on that
trust line. Otherwise, they can send payments across mutual
acquaintances. Payments “ripple” through trust lines between
payer and payee if there is an uninterrupted chain of trust
lines. Alternatively, they can send each other XRP, which can
be sent from any user to any other without the need for trust
lines. If the payment requires a currency exchange, the amount
flows through offers on the distributed exchange, which works
like a digital FX marketplace. People post offers on the Ledger,
and the system matches outgoing payments with open offers to
exchange one currency with another and finds the most suitable
option. The offers included in the calculation do not only include
direct exchanges between one currency and another, but also
offers to exchange the outgoing currency with XRP, and XRP
to the destination currency. This feature is called autobridging,
and it uses XRP as a bridge asset in exotic or illiquid currency
pairs (Birla, 2018). Furthermore, XRP promises to provide “on-
demand liquidity” (Ripple, 2019a): rather than relying on batched
payments as in the case of foreign exchange payments routed
through major international currencies, the XRP ledger sources
liquidity on a payment-by-payment basis.
From the beginning, Ripple marketed itself as a “new and
better Bitcoin” for the unbanked and underbanked (Bullington,
2014; Detmering, 2014; Long, 2014). Bitcoin promised a cheap
and fast means for value transfer, but its high transaction fees and
slow transaction processing prevented Bitcoin from delivering
on that promise (Schwartz et al., 2014). Ripple, conversely,
promised higher speed, and lower fees and by providing an
interoperability layer between payment systems. Ripple promises
to be the Internet Protocol for a new Internet of Value in the
making (Leonard, 2017). A 2014 post perfectly encapsulates
this turn of blockchain technologies into a new frontier of
capital expansion:
“Far from its misunderstood characterization as an ideological
revolution to usurp institutions or a subversive vehicle for the
dark arts, the cryptocurrency movement is about advancing the
frontier” (Liu, 2014).
Ripple’s proposition for the poor focuses primarily on
new opportunities for profits and market expansion for
financial institutions:
“In addition to allowing poor customers to become a
profitable market segment, open protocols and distributed
architectures can enable entirely new and novel offerings.”
(Aranda and Zagone, 2015).
To allow the poor to become a profitable market segment,
hence advancing the frontier, Ripple’s interoperability protocols
promise to unlock the pools of liquidity “trapped” in Nostro and
Vostro accounts, that Ripple estimated between US$ 1.6 to 5
trillion (Zagone, 2016; Ripple, 2018a). Here is a statement of one
of Ripple’s software developers:
“We found in our research that the biggest cost was the cost of
capital. So, banks had a huge amount of money sitting in Nostro
and Vostro accounts all over the world to be able to facilitate
payments. So, you have two options: I can either offer you, my
customer, an immediate payment, or I can make you wait. If
I want to provide you with instant payments, I need to have
liquidity sitting in the destination country where you want to send
to, all the time1.”
As said before, this liquidity pressure is particularly hard,
especially in low-value payments, for MTOs rather than banks.
Here is a comment from a Brazilian remittance company, part
of RippleNet:
“So, the client would pay in our account, and we would have to
send these transactions to a partner bank’s account for them to be
able to send it abroad. If we had, let’s say, 100 transactions a day,
we would send 100 SWIFT messages. And that, of course, brings
up the cost of the transactions, because it depends on the corridor,
but it’s 20 reais to send a SWIFT [. . . ]. The euro is worthmore than
four times more than reais, so when I am increasing the volumes
that I settle in euros, I actually send a lot of reais abroad. That
means that I have less liquidity in Brazil, and at the end of the day
it’s really hard for a small company to operate at high volumes if
you actually have to pre-fund an account2.”
MTOs are more vulnerable to de-risking because of the
inherently hierarchical design of payment systems: payment
systems are layered, resembling a pyramid, with central banks at
the top, hosting commercial banks’ accounts, which in turn host
MTOs’ and individuals’ accounts (CPSS, 2003, p. 3). On the XRP
Ledger, conversely, any account can issue liabilities in the form
of a trust line, and all issuers are treated equally by the Ledger.
This quote from an interview with a former software engineer at
Ripple explains this principle quite clearly:
“Now if you’re a lower level business like a remittance company,
you have a bank account. You keep your money in a bank, and
you are a lower tier organization. If [an MTO] tried to help
move money for banks and said, “Oh good, you deposit money
here,” banks would go “No, no, no. That’s the wrong way around.
You’re below us.” In the financial ecosystem, if you are a bank
and you want to use XRP to send money, you need to buy it from
someone, and where do you buy it from? You can’t go “Oh bank,
1Confidential interview, 25th May 2018, minutes 10:10 – 10:35.
2Confidential interview, 5th December 2018, minutes 51:00 – 52:00.
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we want you to deposit a bunch of Euros into [a cryptocurrency
exchange],” that’s upside down for them. But for a payment service
provider like a remittance company, that’s fine: they have lots of
bank accounts with people. If you say, “We’ll open a bank account
at [this exchange]” They’d go “Awesome, I’ve got to keep my
money somewhere, might as well use XRP3.”
The promise of leveling the payment system hierarchy is
mirrored by another interviewee, this time about the relationship
between banks and countries in the Global South:
“In Thailand, they are quite keen [to use crypto], because
their credit score is already comparatively lower than advanced
economies [. . . ]. In Mexico, again, because the country’s score is
quite low, they are quite happy to use cryptocurrencies. You sell
USD, buy XRP, you sell XRP and buy Mexican peso. The thing is
that those two separate transactions happen precisely at the same
time, so a bank would never have to hold XRP, would never have a
position, being exposed if the value might go down. Because that’s
a significant risk, right?4”
Originally, Ripple’s business proposition was to substitute CBRs
and SWIFT with the XRP Ledger. Financial institutions and
MTOs would have been gateways, i.e., accounts on the XRP
Ledgers that accept deposits off-ledger and issue trust lines
on the ledger to represent those deposits. Messaging, clearing,
and settlement of cross-border payments would have happened
by rippling on trust lines from payers to payees through the
gateways. FX market makers and liquidity providers would have
issued exchange offers and provided the liquidity necessary
to fund cross-currency payments. Regulatory uncertainties and
reluctance from financial institutions—especially banks—made
Ripple develop the Interledger Protocol or ILP (Thomas and
Schwartz, 2015). ILP does not send payments over a blockchain:
instead, it synchronizes the ledgers of all financial institutions
in the Ripple network (RippleNet). This ensures that both legs
of cross-border transactions happen simultaneously, and they
either both succeed or they both fail. In transaction-processing
software jargon, this property is called atomicity and, together
with consistency, isolation, and durability, constitutes the so
called ACID test of transaction processing. As Amsterdam (2001;
cf. IBM, 2019b) succinctly puts it,
“An activity is atomic if it either happens in its entirety, or
does not happen at all. Atomicity is crucial for writing correct
software in many applications; for example, a bank’s software may
implement a transfer from account A to account B as a withdrawal
from A followed by a deposit to B. If the first action happens, then
the second had better happen as well.”
The promise of mobilizing idle assets by synchronizing
circulation performs an imaginary of money as liquidity and
lubricant of the engine of the economy. At the same time, it fulfills
3Confidential interview, 15th May 2018, minutes 1:01:25 – 1:02:31. Names of
partners and companies removed.
4Confidential interview, 10th October 2017, minutes 20:00 – 21:40. Names of
partners and companies removed.
the promise of the seamlessness of exchanges and frictionlessness
of flows typical of logistics (Maurer, 2012b; Plantin and
Punathambekar, 2019). Much as just-in-time logistics promised
to make the warehouse obsolete, so instant payments promise to
make Nostro and Vostro accounts outdated, or so the belief goes
(Gregson et al., 2017). Standardization of messaging, clearing,
and settlement work like the size of the railway gauge, the
standardized dimensions of the shipping container, and the open
telecommunication protocols of Ethernet, SMTP, and TCP-IP in
making flows seamless and reserves and warehouses redundant
(Liu, 2015; Rossiter, 2016).
On top of cutting transaction costs, Ripple also promises
to tackle another source of correspondent banking de-risking,
namely KYC-AML compliance costs. In multiple hearings and
public consultations, Ripple pledged to provide stronger visibility
of funds transfers than what SWIFT can deliver. As a response to
the UKPayment System regulator, Ripple articulated the visibility
of transactions on the XRP Ledger in this way: “Unlike payments
sent through correspondent banking today, which are opaque
at best, Ripple Ledger provides complete end-to-end transaction
traceability” (Gifford, 2015, p. 13). This is a sharp change from
the concern with anonymity and privacy that heralded the
very emergence of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies
(Swartz, 2018, p. 632).
In at least one case an MTO reported that the integration in
Ripple was a success, saying:
“We have since seen very good results: we were able to bring
down the prices of the operations, we don’t charge a SWIFT fee
to our clients anymore. Previously we were charging a cost of 20
Brazilian reais, which is about 7 dollars5.”
However, Ripple’s website only rarely provides assessments of the
direct savings for intermediaries and end-users. Furthermore, it is
too early to tell whether there is uniformity in the benefits across
the Ripple network. Rather than assessing Ripple’s successes and
failures, this paper illustrates the changing landscape of actors,
interests, and promises surrounding new payment technologies.
While payments powered by the Interledger Protocol are now
live in many corridors, payments using the cryptocurrency XRP
are being rolled out only recently. Ripple announced that xRapid,
their corporate product that uses XRP as a bridge asset, was being
used in the US-Mexico corridor on the 1st of October 2018.
On the 17th of June 2019, Ripple entered an agreement with
MoneyGram. This company is the world’s second-largest MTO
after Western Union (Meola, 2016), with a market capitalization
of US$ 148 million (Nasdaq, 2019) and an average revenue per
quarter of US$ 300 million (MoneyGram, 2019). According to
this agreement, Ripple will provide up to US$ 50 million in
exchange for equity in MoneyGram over 2 years, and the two
companies will jointly work on XRP-enabled payments (Ripple,
2019b). After signing this agreement, MoneyGram’s stock
increased by 155% in valuation (Easton and Bloomberg, 2019).
5Confidential interview, 5th December 2018, minutes 1:45–17:35.
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The application of Ripple to correspondent banking entailed
a change both of its money cultures and the political economy
of its actual use. From a hawala credit network geared toward
Local Exchange Trading System (LETS), Ripple became more
oriented toward profit maximization. A senior Ripple employee
synthesized Ripple’s morphing thusly:
“You can still use the XRP Ledger as a distributed exchange, as
a LETS system, as a hawala-like community credit and lending.
And now, we kind of said “what is the product-market fit for this
Ledger? What’s the market that we can target with it?” And most
of the use cases that we were most interested in the early days
like community credits and the LETS feature and the issued asset
feature, there just wasn’t really a market for it, we didn’t see a way
that we as Ripple as a company could target. That does not mean
that if another company wanted to use the XRP Ledger to target
community credit market, that would be wonderful, but Ripple
had to focus on something6.”
Ripple raised a total of US$ 93.6 million in Venture Capital (VC)
funding across eight funding rounds between 2012 and 2016.
The company also holds a sizeable amount of the cryptoasset
XRP, which brought its valuation at US$ 20 billion in January
2019, given the market price of XRP in cryptocurrency exchanges
(CoinMarketCap, 2019; Rooney, 2019). The MTO TransferGo,
presenting at a public Ripple event, described the aim of the
partnership in enabling its business to grow: “how do you get
from 1 to 10 to 100 million users?” (Ripple, 2018d minute
5:45). The Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), furthermore, recently
launched a Japan-Thailand remittance product based on Ripple’s
technologies (Marquer, 2017). As SCB’s Chief Technology
Officer reported, the partnership with Ripple and the focus on
remittances aim toward an “aggressive ambition and expansion”
of SCB (Ripple, 2018c minute 7:00).
The move of Ripple’s solutions toward profit maximization
entails and implies Ripple’s incorporation in existing regulatory
structures. Ripple was the second blockchain company to obtain
a New York bitcoin license in July 2016 (NYS - DFS, 2016).
Ben Lawsky, the very author of the bitcoin license, went on to
join Ripple’s board of directors (Ripple, 2019a). Ripple has also
been a member of payment improvements working groups of
established by the Automated Clearing House and the Federal
Reserve in the US, and it collaborated on Real-Time Gross
Settlement (RTSG) improvement efforts in the UK and Saudi
Arabia (Bank of England, 2017; Ripple, 2018b).
Blockchain technologies are the latest development in network
technologies promising “frictionless capitalism” (Pesch and
Ishmaev, 2019, 4) in the form of low transaction costs and
disintermediation. However, as these technologies gain traction,
new forms of expertise, specialization, and institutionalization
create new frictions and costs. While blockchain technologies
disintermediate internally, they re-intermediate, albeit in a
decentralized way, between each other. As Nelms et al. (2018)
have it, blockchain disintermediation coexists with walled
gardens and “siloed” networks that cannot interoperate with
6Confidential interview, 30th May 2019, minutes 59:00 – 1:00:00.
each other. The frontier of disintermediation and transaction
fee reduction is moving to the so-called “Layer 2” and
“Layer 3” technologies, such as payment channels, decentralized
exchanges, and open interoperability protocols (Poon and Dryja,
2016; Casey, 2018; Herlihy, 2018). The Interledger Protocol
or ILP is one such technology. However, by making Ripple
potentially interoperable with other payment systems, the ILP
simultaneously puts Ripple in danger of seeing its margins eroded
by the competition fostered by its technology (Bloomberg, 2019;
Coppola, 2019; Sloane, 2019).
As the struggle for interoperability moves away from
immediate end-users, blockchain technologies tend to disappear
from view. This eclipse is inherent to technologies becoming
infrastructural: they become taken for granted, and they reappear
only when they break down (Star, 1999). In fact, an MTO
employee said that the application of Ripple’s technologies to
their remittance platform was not associated with co-branding
or with major changes in the user interface and experience7.
However, this disappearance can never be full, lest it becomes
unworkable and economically unviable for the actors deploying
and running it. Rather than leading to the vanishing of any
geographical articulation, these media entail specific geographies
of calculation (DuPont, 2019, 189). The tensions between
“fictions and frictions” (Pesch and Ishmaev, 2019) that propel
blockchain technologies’ expansion in the payment space is not
accidental, but inherent to the economic theories, models, and
assumptions that these technologies perform.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzed remittances by foregrounding the
infrastructure that makes these payments possible, i.e.,
correspondent banking. This focus is all the more timely
as formalization draws a bigger and bigger proportion of
remittance flows into formal banking channels. Blockchain
technologies do not represent a rupture in the tendency toward
remittance formalization. Instead, these innovations may
strengthen formalization and capitalization on remittances. By
promising interoperability and frictionless payments, blockchain
technologies aim to free idle capital, democratize liquidity
and flatten the existing “pyramid” of monies encompassing
MTOs, correspondent banking accounts, clearinghouses, and
central bank settlement systems (Caytas, 2016; Wandhöfer,
2017). Simultaneously, the use of blockchain technologies
to expand the frontier of market relations turns blockchain
technologies themselves into a newmarket frontier through their
incorporation in legacy infrastructures, business solutions, and
public and private regulation. Furthermore, the original stress
and focus on anonymity is attenuated by harnessing the capacity
of blockchain technologies to better track transactions.
The imaginary of frictionless circulation and transaction cost
annihilation has its own inherent limits. While a blockchain
can provide interoperability and simultaneity of clearing
and settlement, each blockchain is a separate network,
7Confidential interview 5th December 2018, minutes 45:40 – 47:00.
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following its own rules and following different accounting
standards. As more and more blockchain technologies
emerge, this creates more, not fewer intermediaries, with
the result of reproducing the transaction costs that were
meant to disappear. Hence, blockchain interoperability
moves the competition from the cross-border to cross-
chain payments, as testified by the emergence of “Layer
2” interoperability solutions. Despite the flamboyance of
blockchain marketing, its most important applications
will impact on less flashy and more “boring” sectors of
banking and payments, such as middleware (DuPont,
2019, p. 172) and back-office reporting and interoperability
(Fanning and Centers, 2016).
Hence, the “inherent” tendency of blockchain technologies
toward disintermediation is not unambiguous. As existing
and incumbent financial players are flocking toward
blockchain technologies for clearing and settlement of
payments, existing power structures can be challenged but
also reinvented and reinforced. Maurer (2015b) rightly
pointed out that the ownership, design, and access to
payment infrastructures are deeply political problems
that refer to the nature of money as a social institution.
Blockchain research, based on the novelty and unruly origins
of the technology, has produced a wealth of literature
both on its technical aspects and inner workings, on the
alternative imaginaries that inform this design, and on
the economic practices that it can enable. The increased
corporate co-optation and competition, comparatively,
received far less scrutiny. This paper, hence, tried to
show the process of co-optation and formalization without
giving analytical primacy to either existing infrastructures or
emergent technologies.
The impact of blockchain technologies is ambiguous, both in
terms of costs, risks, and speed, and in political and moral terms
(Campbell-Verduyn and Goguen, 2018). As Caytas (2016) has
it, cost-benefit analyses are particularly hard in this field, due to
its ever-changing transformations (Godfrey-Welch et al., 2018).
Again, the interviews I conducted seem to point toward a general
appreciation of the improvements brought by Ripple, but more
research is needed in the lived experience of the payers. This
paper pointed out that there is a gap in the literature on the
“rails and pipelines” that underpin remittance transfers, and that
most of the research tends to concentrate on the point of sale.
This paper’s limitation is specular: by foregrounding remittance
infrastructure, this paper has comparatively overlooked the
individual end-users.
For both blockchain enthusiasts and skeptics, the literature
tends to produce an infrastructural double inversion. Bowker
and Star (2000, p. 34) defined infrastructural inversion as a
methodological move that, counter to infrastructure’s invisibility
in everyday life, foregrounds the material and technological
substratum that makes social practices possible. Blockchain
literature has been beneficial in foregrounding and in making
“transparent” this technology (DuPont, 2019). However, it
has somehow obscured and forgotten the broader social
processes in which it is inscribed and deployed. The adoption
of these technologies is often narrated as a process of
actualization of inherent positive or negative tendencies and
potentialities, rather than a process of mutual shaping, dependent
on enabling and disabling factors. This literature needs to
reconcile with previous scholarship on money and finance
to understand not only how the new technology impacts
on existing hierarchies, but how both existing and emerging
technologies influence one another. Blockchain technologies
are neither embryonic forms of radically different societies
and monetary systems, nor business as usual. Instead, they
“productively engage in and perform a plurality [of modes
of finance], thus blurring the line between alternative and
dominant, formal and informal, embedded and disembedded”
(Maurer, 2012c, p. 415). The study of digital money needs to
foreground competition, conflict, and redistribution of resources,
beyond both solutionism (Morozov, 2013) and dystopian
cynicism (Golumbia, 2016).
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